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“In Washington, the view is that the banks are to be regulated, and my view is that Washington 
and the regulators are there to serve the banks.” 
Rep. Spencer Bachus – chairman of the House Financial Services Committee in the 112th Congress1 
 
1. Introduction 
The relationship between banking and politics is an intimate one.  Governments control 
the supply of banks in the economy through chartering restrictions and licensing, they set up 
institutions that provide depositors with insurance and banks with a lender of last resort, and 
routinely set rules that attempt to govern the risk taking behaviour of banks.   
Indeed, according to the bi-annual “Banking Banana Skins” survey by Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers and the Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation, “political interference” was rated 
as the number one risk that banks faced in 2010.2  Surprising, given the international banking 
system had witnessed possibly the worst crisis on record which was largely attributed to credit 
and liquidity risks.  And ironic given the banks were bailed out by politicians using public 
money. 
This active role of government in the banking sector creates an incentive problem: on the 
one hand, governments play a role in the creation of institutions that make a banking system 
possible, while on the other hand they quite often look to the banking system to facilitate their 
own political survival.  Political support can be indirect, through say, subsidized lending to 
preferred industries or direct in the form of campaign contributions or a share of profits due to 
ownership.  For example, according to the Centre for Responsive Politics, Spencer Bachus, who 
is the chairman of the House Financial Services Committee in the 112th Congress, raised over 
                                                            
1 Quoted from an interview with The Birmingham News on 8 December 2010. 
2 See http://www.pwc.com.au/media-centre/2010/political-interference-banking-risks-feb10.htm  
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$2.3 million in campaign funds in 2011-2012 with the top five industries being commercial 
banks, securities and investment, insurance, real estate and finance/credit companies contributing 
over 40%. 
So while a healthy banking system can be huge source of benefit for politicians, bank 
failure on the other hand, can get politicians into electoral hot water.  Politicians therefore have 
incentives to interfere with bank closure rules to, for example, favour preferred (politically 
connected) constituents or simply to avoid the political costs associated with failure. 
There have been several examples in the media of political interference in the banking 
system.  Probably the most famous case is that of Lincoln Savings and Loans, where five US 
senators3 (known as the “Keating Five”) were accused of improperly intervening in a regulatory 
investigation of Charles H. Keating, Jr. (Chairman of the Lincoln Savings and Loan Association) 
by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) in 1987.  Lincoln Savings and Loans 
eventually collapsed in 1989, at a cost of over $3 billion to the federal government.  The 
substantial political contributions Keating had made to each of the senators, totalling $1.3 
million, attracted considerable public and media attention leading to a Senate Ethics Committee 
investigation in which three of the senators were found to have “substantially and improperly 
interfered with the FHLBB’s investigation” and the other two while being cleared were still 
criticized for exercising “poor judgement”.  All five senators served out their terms; however, 
only two ran for re-election.4 
A more recent example is that of Cleveland thrift AmTrust, whose failure was delayed by 
11 months because Ohio Congressman Steven LaTourette and Cleveland mayor Frank Jackson 
                                                            
3  Alan Cranston (Democrat of California), Dennis DeConcini (Democrat of Arizona), John Glenn (Democrat of 
Ohio), John McCain (Republican of Arizona), and Donald W. Riegle, Jr. (Democrat of Michigan) 
4 John Glenn (Democrat of Ohio) and John McCain (Republican of Arizona) were cleared of the charges and re-ran 
for office. 
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intervened when the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) tried to seize and sell the 
institution in January 2009.5  By the time AmTrust was finally seized by the FDIC on December 
4, 2009 its common equity had fallen by $667 million to $276 million from the year before.  The 
failure cost the FDIC insurance fund $2 billion. 
Are these incidents isolated cases?  Or are they representative of a more systematic 
phenomenon?  A natural place to look for systematic evidence of political interference in 
banking is around elections as this is when bank failure can potentially be the most costly to a 
politician.  Bank failure typically leads to costs that are borne by the local voting population6, 
leading the electorate to question the competency of the incumbent in regulating the banking 
sector.  Accordingly, politicians have the incentive to take costly action to delay bank failure 
during election periods.  Further, the economic cost of delay (possibly from larger losses to the 
insurance fund than would otherwise be the case) is widespread across taxpayers, whereas the 
benefits are concentrated with interest groups like bank owners, employees, uninsured depositors 
as well as small business borrowers that cannot access alternative sources of financing – thus, 
exacerbating the political incentive to delay bank failure in an election year (see Stigler, 1971; 
Peltzman, 1976; and Becker, 1983 for more on interest groups). 
Our empirical application tests this conjecture using data from the United States (US) 
between 1934 and 2012, covering all failed banks (3995) documented by the FDIC.7  We use a 
hazard analysis to exploit the significant cross-state and within-state exogenous variations in 
gubernatorial electoral timing to explain bank failure.  A consistent picture emerges: bank failure 
                                                            
5 AmTrust was issued with a cease and desist order in November 2008, and when they failed to recapitalise by the 
deadline of December 31, 2008 the FDIC stepped in.  The local politicians were able to delay the failure by 
convincing Treasury and the White House to stop the FDIC intervention.   
6 For example, due to losses to: (1) uninsured depositors; (2) shareholders; (3) bank employees; and (4) small 
business borrowers who cannot switch to other parties. 
7 Note, while our summary statistics include all bank failures between 1934 and 2012, our regression analyses 
requires accounting data which are only available between 1976 and 2010, covering 1966 bank failures. 
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is much less likely to occur in the 12 months leading up to an election than non-election periods.  
Our results are not only statistically significant but also economically meaningful.  On average, 
bank failure is approximately 45% less likely in the year leading up to an election.  The results 
are robust to multiple model specifications and estimation techniques.   
We also investigate the role of political control (i.e. lack of political competition) in 
determining the election year fall in hazard rate, we construct a variable to capture instances 
where the incumbent governor’s party has control (i.e. holds the majority of seats) of both the 
lower and upper house simultaneously (i.e. complete control of the state legislature).  We show 
that years in which the governor’s party has complete political control heading into an election 
can explain all of the average pre-election fall in the hazard rate.  In particular, our estimates 
suggest that the magnitude of the election year reduction in failure rate more than doubles for 
banks in states where the governor has complete control heading into an election.8   
Our work is related to several streams of literature.  First, our work is most related to a 
paper by Brown and Dinc (2005) who study electoral incentives to delay bank failure for a 
sample of 164 banks (40 of which failed) in developing countries between 1994 and 2000.  They 
conduct their analysis at the bank level and show that bank failure is much less likely before an 
election.  Our work complements and extends theirs in several ways.  First, a key focus of our 
analysis is on political competition and political control and its impact on bank failure during 
election years.  Second, our study in a US setting provides us with a much larger sample of banks 
and a much larger number of failed banks.  Moreover, the US setting is useful since the 
                                                            
8 We also investigate the role of electoral competition in contributing to the reduction in the election year hazard 
rate.  One might expect that the benefits associated with delaying bank failure increase with the degree of electoral 
competition (i.e. bank failure matters more to re-election chances when elections are close).  However, our results 
from these analyses are not statistically significant. We argue that this weak electoral competition result may be due 
to the fact that while a lack of political competition reduces the benefit of delaying bank failure, it also reduces the 
costs of delaying bank failure (discussed in section 5) – the net effect is therefore an empirical issue.  
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gubernatorial election cycle is not only exogenous, but also differs both across and within state.9  
Third, their analysis is conducted for banks in developing countries where corruption is arguably 
more of a problem.  In contrast, we study the bank failure in the US – a developed democracy – 
and show that political incentives to delay bank failure near elections remain strong.   
Second, our work relates directly to the early work arguing that politicians have 
incentives to take actions to induce favourable macroeconomic outcomes before elections (see 
for example, McRae, 1977; Nordhaus, 1975; and Rogoff and Sibert, 1988).  More recent works 
by Levitt (1997, 2002) use election cycles to instrument for the number of police in his study of 
the relation between police and crime – arguing that politicians tend to hire more police prior to 
elections.  Election cycles have also been used recently in the analysis of corporate investment 
decisions; Julio and Yook (2012) document a fall in corporate investment corresponding with 
timing of national elections around the world. 
Third, this paper is related to a broad literature examining various aspects of the political 
economy of banking and bank regulation.  Earlier work examining the role of politics and the 
incentives for regulators to intervene in failing banks’ operations include Kroszner and Strahan 
(1996), who show that regulators deferred the realization of costs in failing Savings and Loan 
(S&L) associations in the United States.  Kroszner and Strahan (1999) also study the political 
economy factors that determine the timing of state level relaxation of bank branching restrictions 
in the US and find that private-interest (or positive) theory of regulation (Stigler, 1971; and 
Peltzman, 1976) best explains the timing of branching deregulation.  Rosenbluth and Schaap 
(2003) study how electoral rules (centrifugal vs. centripetal) shape the way politicians choose to 
                                                            
9 Not all states hold gubernatorial elections in the same year.  Moreover, some states change their constitution and, 
for example, switch from a 2-year election cycle to a 4-year election cycle during our sample period. 
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regulate their national banking sectors and the resultant impact on market structure.  Most 
recently, Dam and Koetter (2012) show that political factors determine the likelihood of bank 
bailout and therefore bank risk taking (moral hazard). 
Finally, our paper is related to the large and important debate on the role of political 
competition in determining the degree of corrupt behaviour by public officials.  Theoretical 
studies, for example, by Barro (1973), Rose-Ackerman (1978), Ferejohn (1986), Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993); Aidt (2003), Alt and Lassen (2003) conclude that political competition tends to 
ameliorate corrupt behaviour.  Empirical contributions also find support for the idea that political 
competition reduces corruption (see for example, Kunivcova and Rose-Ackerman, 2005; 
Lederman et. al., 2005; Tavits, 2007; and Nyblade and Reed, 2008).  We also find that political 
competition tends to discipline politicians from delaying bank failure, while political control 
exacerbates the problem. 
The next section discusses the nature of bank failure and bank regulation in the US 
context.  Section three discusses how the US election cycle works and provides some historical 
background on political competition and bank failure in the US.  Section four outlines our 
empirical approach, presents our main results and robustness test.  Section five presents the 
results from additional tests to investigate the role of political competition and control.  Finally, 
section six concludes. 
 
2. Bank failure 
The US banking sector is unique in the sense that there are an incredibly large number of 
banks, most of which are relatively small.  Bank failure is also more frequent relative to other 
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countries making the US an ideal setting to study bank failure.  Data on bank failures and the 
characteristics of the failing banks at the time of failure are sourced from the FDIC.  The FDIC 
has a number of ways in which it deals with a failing institution, so “failure” does not always 
imply the bank in question ceases to operate.  Broadly, the FDIC categorizes failures into: (1) 
those in which the bank’s charter survives or “assistance transactions”; and (2) those in which 
the bank charter is terminated or “outright failure”.  In the case of the former, the FDIC either (1) 
provides direct assistance to the failing bank, known as an open bank assistance (OBA) 
transaction10; or (2) provides assistance to an acquiring institution to purchase the entire failing 
bank.  In the case of the latter, the bank charter is terminated and its assets are auctioned off.11  In 
what follows we initially consider both assistance transactions and outright failures as the same.  
In later analysis, we examine whether the type of failure differs around gubernatorial elections. 
Bank regulation in the US is also segmented.  While the FDIC insures all deposit taking 
institutions, the chartering authority differs depending on whether the institution is a national 
bank, a state bank or thrift.  The chartering authority for national banks is the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) while states banks are chartered by state regulators.12  
Thrifts on the other hand are chartered by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) which is a 
federal agency.13 
Panel A in Table 1 presents a summary of all failed banks.  In total, there have been 3995 
bank failures in the US between 1934 and 2012.  Not surprisingly, these have been concentrated 
                                                            
10 OBA transactions were popular leading into and during the S&L crisis but lost their lustre following the passage 
of Financial Recovery, Institutions Reform and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989 and the FDIC Improvement 
Act (FDICIA) of 1992.  The FDICIA in particular made it more difficult for the FDIC to provide assistance to 
failing banks unless it could: (1) demonstrate that this would minimize the cost to the insurance fund or; (2) show 
that the closure of the failing bank will increase the risk of systematic failure (Mingo, 1994). 
11 For more detail on FDIC transaction types see: http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/help.asp  
12 Supervision is carried out by the FDIC in the case of state banks while the Federal Reserve supervises national 
banks as well as state banks electing to be members of the Federal Reserve System. 
13 The OTS was dissolved on July 2011 and its powers transferred to the OCC. 
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(2822 failures) in the two major crises since the great depression: the S&L crisis, 1986-1992 and 
the recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC), 2007-2010.  As we will discuss below, appropriately 
controlling for these crises is very important for our analysis.  Failures are also concentrated in 
the Southern states where almost half (1979) of the failures were recorded.  Of the failures, 2528 
were commercial banks (815 with national charters and 1713 state chartered) and 1467 were 
thrifts.  In terms of the two broad categories of FDIC failure transactions, unlike Brown and Dinc 
(2005), most of the failures in our sample are outright failures whereby the banks charter is 
terminated and it ceases to operate – only 593 of the 3995 failures are assistance transactions 
where the bank’s charter continues.  Since our regression analysis below requires bank 
accounting data which are only available from 1976, we also report a summary of the failed bank 
sample for banks failing from 1976 onwards in the bottom half of Panel A.  The distribution of 
bank failures is largely the same as described for the full sample.  Briefly, 3473 of the 3995 
failures occurred between 1976 and 2012.  Of these failures, 719 are national banks, 1289 are 
state banks, 591 are assistance transactions and 2882 are outright failures. 
 
3. Elections in the US 
Election timing in the US is exogenously determined by law.  Since 1845, Election Day 
occurs on the Tuesday in November after the first Monday – so Election Day must fall 
somewhere between November 2 and November 8 (inclusive).  Presidential elections follow a 
four year cycle on even numbered years.  Other federal offices (House of Representatives and 
Senate) run on a two year cycle on even numbered years (i.e. on presidential election years as 
well as mid-term elections).   
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At the state level, most states choose to run their gubernatorial elections in the same years 
at the federal elections (i.e. gubernatorial elections coincide with either presidential or mid-term 
elections).  Only five states run their gubernatorial elections in “off-years” or odd-numbered 
years.14  In all but the states of New Hampshire and Vermont, gubernatorial elections currently 
follow a four year cycle.15 
For example, consider the Ohio General Assembly which is the state legislature of the US 
state of Ohio.16  State election years coincide with federal midterm elections (i.e. 2010, 2014, 
2018, 2022, etc.) – election day involves electing: Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of 
State, Treasurer of State, Auditor of State, Attorney General, State Senators (odd-numbered 
districts), State Representatives, State Board of Education (one-third of members), Supreme 
Court Justices (two or three) and some county officials.17  In some cases, states have changed the 
length of their gubernatorial election cycle.  For example, in 1986 the state of Arizona changed 
from holding gubernatorial elections every two years to every four years.   
Accordingly, unlike presidential elections, there are substantial across and within state 
variations in the timing of gubernatorial elections.  We exploit this exogenous variation in 
gubernatorial election timing to study whether bank failure can be explained by electoral 
concerns.  Since we are focusing on gubernatorial elections, the financial institutions of interest 
are state banks whose charters are controlled by state authorities.  While thrifts and nationally 
                                                            
14 These are Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, and Virginia 
15 These two states hold gubernatorial elections every two years. 
16 It consists of the 99-member Ohio House of Representatives and the 33-member Ohio Senate.  Both houses of the 
General Assembly meet at the Ohio Statehouse in Columbus.   
17 Other state races such as those for State Senators (even-numbered districts), State Representatives, State Board of 
Education (one-third of members), Supreme Court Justices (two or three) and remaining county officials are held on 
Presidential election years (2012, 2016, 2020, etc.).  State election days also involve electing the federal offices of: 
the President of the United States, U.S. Senators (if term expires), and Representatives to Congress. 
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chartered banks are not the focus of the main analysis, they are included in our summary 
statistics for a more complete picture. 
Let the election date be day 0, we report in Table 1 the frequency of bank failure for a 24 
month period around day 0 (i.e. 12 months prior to and 12 months after an election) as well as 
the failures that fall outside this 24 month window.  As mentioned previously, since a number of 
states either currently or historically hold gubernatorial elections every two years we choose the 
[12, +12] window since this is the longest possible window around a gubernatorial election that 
does not crossover into elections preceding and following it.  
If we compare the number of failures that occur in the 12 months prior to an election date 
to the number that occur in the 12 months following an election date, we find that (for the full 
sample) 941 failures occur in the 12 months leading up to a gubernatorial election while 963 
failures occur in the 12 months following.  The remaining 2091 failures fall outside our [-12, 
+12] window.18   
While these data show that there are fewer bank failures in the 12 months prior to an 
election compared to the 12 months after, the difference is not meaningful.  Further investigation 
shows that failures clustered in crises periods tend to coincide with the pre-election period.  To 
see this, we sub-divide the sample into crisis periods (i.e. the S&L Crisis 1986-1992 and the 
Global Financial Crisis 2007-2010) versus non-crisis periods (i.e. all other years).  The second 
column of Panel A in Table 1 shows that in crisis years, 705 failures occur in the 12 months 
leading up to an election while only 577 occur in the 12 months following.  We argue that there 
                                                            
18 Note that the failures occurring outside our [-12, +12] window (i.e. “Not around election” rows) are not directly 
comparable with the [-12, 0] and [0, +12] failure counts.  For states with a two year gubernatorial election cycle, 
then by definition, banks will fail either before or after an election.  However, for states with a four year election 
cycle, the “Not around election” period represents a 24 month period – so the failure count would have to be divided 
by two to be comparable our pre- and post-election windows.   
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are several reasons why we should concern ourselves predominantly with investigating political 
incentives to delay failure in non-crisis years.  First, during a crisis, the political cost to a local 
politician associated with a bank failure is lower since he can – in part or in full – deflect the 
cause of the failure away from his potential mismanagement of the economy and bank 
regulation.  Second, bank failure tends to be more severe during a crisis which accordingly 
makes it more difficult for politicians to delay regulatory intervention, other things equal.  These 
differing incentives during a crisis imply we are much less likely to observe political factors 
determining bank failure.   
Looking at the third column of Table 1 Panel A, we see that in non-crisis periods, 236 
failures occur in the 12 months prior to an election whereas 386 fail in the 12 months after.  
These data imply that the frequency of bank failure is almost 40% lower in the 12 months before 
an election compared to the 12 months after.  These findings are best illustrated in Figure 1.  
Here, the blue bars plot the number of bank failures in 3-month blocks leading up to an election 
while the pink bars plot the number of bank failures in 3-month blocks in the months after state 
elections.  The blue and pink horizontal dashed lines represent the average number of bank 
failures in a 3-month period before and after elections respectively.  Figure 1a plots bank failure 
for all years between 1934 and 2012 while Figure 1b plots bank failure around elections only for 
non-crisis years – that is, failures that occur during the S&L Crisis (1986-1992) and the Global 
Financial Crisis (2007-2010) are excluded. 
While Figure 1a shows no discernible difference between the pre- and post-election 
failure rates (235 vs. 240 failures per 3-months respectively), a striking picture emerges when we 
control for the clustering of bank failure around crises: bank failure is much less likely in the 
months leading up to an election than in the months after.  For the non-crisis period, the pre- and 
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post-election average numbers of bank failures are 59 and 97 failures per three-months 
respectively.  Therefore, based on raw numbers alone, bank failure is about 40% less likely in the 
months leading up to an election compared to the months following an election.  This finding 
highlights the importance of properly controlling for impact of financial crisis.  The pattern 
described above is largely consistent for our subsamples.  Looking further down column 3 of 
Panel A in Table 1 and comparing failures in the pre-election period to the post-election we find 
that failure is 53% less frequent for all commercial banks (151 failures pre- vs. 323 failures post-
election), 57% less frequent for state charted banks (115 failures pre- vs. 267 failures post-
election), 30% less frequent for all banks and thrifts in the 1976-2012 period (145 failures pre- 
vs. 206 failures post-election), 58% less frequent for commercial banks in the 1976-2012 period 
(60 failures pre- vs. 143 failures post-election), and 63% less frequent for state chartered banks 
in the 1976-2012 period (43failures pre- vs. 117 failures post-election). 
Up to this point, we have used the term bank failure to mean both outright failures where 
banks lose their charter and cease to operate as well as FDIC assistance transactions where a 
failing institution is restructured with FDIC assistance and allowed to continue to operate under 
its existing charter.  However, if we split all failures into two subsamples depending on the 
failure type, we find that for the 1934-2012 non-crisis sample (column 3 of Table 1 Panel A), 
outright failures are about 55% less frequent in the months leading up to an election compared to 
the months following (154 failures pre- versus. 339 failures post-election).  Yet, interestingly, we 
find that FDIC assistance transactions are much more likely in the months leading into an 
election.  Based on our raw data, assistance is almost 75% more likely to occur in the 12 months 
leading up to an election (82 failures pre- versus 47 failures post-election).  It appears as though 
an alternative to delaying outright bank failure, politicians can also opt to provide assistance to 
14 
 
failing banks so that they can continue to operate in the year leading up to an election.  In Figure 
2 we plot the frequency of bank failures around elections separately for outright failures (Figure 
2a) and assistance transactions (Figure 2b).  Like Figure 1 the blue bars plot the number of 
failures in 3-month blocks leading up to an election while the pink bars plot the number of 
failures in 3-month blocks in the months after elections.  The blue and pink horizontal dashed 
lines represent the average number of bank failures in a 3-month period before and after 
elections respectively.  There is a remarkable difference between the two figures: outright 
failures are clearly less frequent prior to elections whereas assistance is much more frequent. 
[INSERT TABLE 1, FIGURES 1 AND 2 HERE] 
 
4. Empirical strategy and results 
 This section describes our empirical approach and presents the results from our analysis.  
We obtain quarterly accounting data for all (failed and surviving) commercial banks operating in 
the US from bank call reports filed with regulators. These data are available from March 31, 
1976 till December 31, 2010.  We hand collect political data on the election dates and outcomes, 
the composition of state legislatures, party affiliation of governor and so on from the Census 
Bureau Statistical Abstracts.19  State macroeconomic data are sourced from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis and Bureau of Labour Studies.  Our final sample of banks for which 
accounting data are available is an unbalanced panel of 22230 banks, of which 1966 fail. 
 Let the election date for state j be day 0, we construct a PRE-ELECTION variable that 
equals one if accounting quarter t of bank i from state j falls in the [-12, 0) month window, and 
                                                            
19 See: http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/elections.html.  These data are also verified using internet 
sources such as http://www.ourcampaigns.com/  
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zero otherwise.  We test whether bank failures, defined as an outright failure or assistance 
transaction, do not depend on the gubernatorial election cycle in a Cox proportional hazard 
model given by20 
 h(t) = exp(β'Xit-1 + 1PRE-ELECTIONit + t + j) (1) 
for t = ti, …, Ti, where ti and Ti represent bank i’s entry and exit dates (quarter) respectively.  In 
particular, the following entry and exit dates are used for the analysis.  Bank i enters the study in 
quarter ti, which is the later of two possible dates: (1) March 31, 1976 (the start of the sample 
period); or (2) the date bank i files its first call report after receiving its charter.  Bank i exits the 
study in quarter Ti, which is the earliest of four possible events: (1) the banks fails (outright) and 
its charter is terminated; (2) the failing bank receives FDIC assistance, is restructured and 
allowed to continue to operate under its existing charter; (3) the bank is acquired by another bank 
so balance sheet data are no longer available for that bank as a separate entity; or (4) the bank 
survives until December 31, 2010 (the end of the sample period).  In what follows, exit scenarios 
(1) and (2) are both considered as bank ‘failure’ unless we explicitly distinguish between the two 
in our discussion.   
Here Xit-1 is a vector of lagged bank level and state level controls, t is a year fixed-effect 
to control for common time effects such as crises and j is a state fixed-effect.  State 
macroeconomic controls (important for appropriately controlling for crises) include: (1) 
GROWTH which is annual state personal income growth; (2) EMPLOYMENT, defined as the 
ratio of total employed persons to total state population; and (3) BUDGET DEFICIT, defined as 
the ratio of total state taxes less total state government expenditure to gross state product.  Bank 
level controls include standard predictors of bankruptcy: (1) SIZE, defined as the natural log of 
                                                            
20 See Shumway (2001) for a discussion of forecasting bankruptcy using hazard models. 
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total deposits; (2) INCOME/ASSETS RATIO, (i.e. return on assets) defined as net income to 
total assets; (3) CAPITAL RATIO, defined as total equity capital to total assets; and (4) NPL, 
defined as non-performing loans (+90 days past due) as a percentage of total loans.  Recent 
policy discussions have emphasized the importance of ‘too big to fail’ in determining bank 
failure and risk taking, accordingly, we also include the variable TOO BIG TO FAIL defined as 
a bank’s assets at quarter t as a percentage of total banking assets in state j at quarter t.  Finally, 
Brown and Dinc (2011) provide evidence from developing countries that a government is less 
likely to takeover or close a failing bank if the banking system is weak.  To capture the 
possibility of a ‘too many to fail’ effect we include in our regressions the variable TOO MANY 
TO FAIL defined as the average capital ratio of all other banks in state j.21   
Panel B in Table 1 presents summary statistics for state controls.22  State income growth 
averaged 7% for the entire sample and is lower (6%) for states in the North East and Mid-West.  
Employment is around 57% across all states, with the Mid-West having the highest employment 
at 58% and the North-East having the lowest at 56%.  States run persistent government deficits, 
averaging 2%, with states in the West having the largest deficits of 3% on average.  Panel C in 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for bank level controls for the full sample as well as for the 
subsamples of failed banks (outright failure and assistance transactions separately) and all other 
banks.  As expected, failed banks are routinely less profitable, have higher non-performing loans 
and lower capital ratios than banks that do not fail.  Of the failed banks, those receiving FDIC 
assistance tend to be slightly better performing on these three measures compared to banks 
failing outright.  Banks failing outright tend to be slightly smaller than non-failing banks ($45 
                                                            
21 We also use alternative proxies for TOO BIG TO FAIL, namely, (1) the average percentage of NPL of all other 
banks in state j; and (2) the average income to assets ratio of all other banks in state j and find similar results (not 
reported). 
22 The regression sample period is 1976-2010 (inclusive). 
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million versus $46 million total deposits), however, banks receiving assistance are significantly 
larger than both banks failing outright and surviving banks with an average deposit base of 
approximately $109 million.  Indeed, if we examine state market shares – our proxy for ‘too big 
to fail’ – we see that banks failing outright control less than 0.3% of state banking assets (almost 
0.5% for surviving banks) compared to 2.1% for banks receiving FDIC assistance.  This 
evidence hints at the possibility of there being a ‘too big to fail’ effect in US bank closure policy: 
larger banks controlling a larger fraction of banking assets tend to receive assistance rather than 
having their charters terminated by regulators.  Finally, comparing our TOO MANY TO FAIL 
variable across our three categories of banks we find that the average capital ratio of other banks 
is slightly lower for failing banks than surviving banks (9.0% vs. 9.9%) which is inconsistent 
with the conjecture that regulators tend to close banks when the banking system is stronger.  For 
banks receiving assistance, the average capital ratio of other banks is 8.8% which is lower than 
the case for outright failure.  Consistent with the ‘too many to fail’ hypothesis, when the banking 
sector is weak, regulators prefer to provide assistance as opposed to closing a bank.  So while the 
evidence on ‘too many to fail’ is somewhat mixed, our summary statistics do suggest the 
possibility of regulatory forbearance when the banking sector is weak, where forbearance comes 
in the form of providing assistance to larger and more systematically important institutions. 
4.1. Elections and bank failure 
 The main regression results are reported in Table 2 Panel A.  Unless explicitly stated in 
the tables, all regressions include state fixed-effects as well as year fixed-effects to control for 
common state and time factors.  Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering at 
the state level.  Regression models 1-3 are performed on the full sample of banks (i.e. federally 
chartered and state chartered banks) whereas models 4-6 use only state chartered banks. 
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A consistent picture emerges: in all specifications, the coefficient on PRE-ELECTION is 
negative suggesting that bank failure is less likely in the year leading up to a gubernatorial 
election.  As discussed earlier (and illustrated in Figure 2) controlling for the impact of financial 
crisis is crucial to our analysis since failures tend to cluster around crises.  While some of the 
impact of crises is accounted for in our time and state fixed effects, it is clear that our results are 
much stronger when time varying macroeconomic controls are added into our specification.  
Indeed, the pre-election effect is significant in all models (2, 3, 5 and 6) where we include 
macroeconomic controls.  The result is also stronger for our sample consisting only of state 
chartered banks – which makes sense given we are studying the impact of gubernatorial 
elections, so the relevant regulatory jurisdiction is at the state level.  To give an indication of the 
economic significance of this pre-election effect, the coefficient for state chartered banks is 
approximately -0.56 which translates to a reduction in the probability of failure by about 45% in 
the year leading up to an election.  For the full sample, the PRE-ELECTION coefficient of -0.45 
translates into a 35% reduction in the probability of failure.23   
Across all specifications, INCOME/ASSETS, SIZE and CAPITAL RATIO are 
negatively related to bank failure whereas higher NPL increases the likelihood of failure.  These 
results are expected and in line with previous studies.  Our macroeconomic controls also provide 
results consistent with expectations.  Higher state income growth and employment reduces the 
likelihood of bank failure, with the effect being stronger for and significant for the regression 
models using the state chartered banks only (models 5 and 6).  This is not surprising given 
federally chartered banks are usually larger and more diversified across state boarders making 
them less sensitive to changes in local economic conditions.  To the extent that delaying bank 
                                                            
23 In comparison, Brown and Dinc (2005) show for their sample of developing country banks that there is a decrease 
in the hazard rate by about 70% in the year leading up to an election. 
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failure involves some fiscal costs, one might expect a positive relation between BUDGET 
DEFICIT and bank failure since states with larger budget deficits are less able to influence the 
timing of bank failure.  Consistent with our conjecture the variable BUDGET DEFICIT is 
positively related to bank failure, however insignificant.  Unlike Brown and Dinc (2011) we find 
no statistically significant evidence of a ‘too many to fail’ effect in our sample of US banks once 
we control for the macroeconomic environment and the ‘too big to fail’ effect.   
Finally, our TOO BIG TO FAIL variable is positive and significant across all 
specifications.  This might at first seem counterintuitive, however, recall: (1) for our hazard 
analysis, we define failure to be either outright failure or FDIC assistance; and (2) from our 
summary statistics, larger banks with a bigger market share are more likely to receive FDIC 
assistance – which may lead to a positive coefficient on TOO BIG TO FAIL.  We investigate this 
explanation for the unintuitive coefficient sign on TOO BIG TO FAIL explicitly in additional 
tests below.   
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
For the remainder of the paper, we indicate which control variables we use in our 
specifications but do not report the coefficient estimates to preserve space.  Moreover, the 
coefficient estimates for our control variables remain largely unchanged for our various 
specifications. 
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4.2. Robustness of the main result 
Before moving on to additional analyses, we perform a series of robustness test on our 
main finding: that bank failure is much less likely in the 12 months prior to an election.  The 
results from these analyses are presented in the following sections. 
4.2.1. Federally chartered banks and gubernatorial elections  
As an initial robustness test, we first repeat our analysis for banks that are always 
chartered federally.  This subsample acts as a placebo because their closure should not be 
affected by state-wide gubernatorial elections.  The results presented in models 7-9 of Table 2 
show that while the PRE-ELECTION variable is negative, it is not significant as expected.  In 
additional tests (not reported), we also examine the impact of the Presidential election cycle on 
the likelihood of failure for federally charted banks and do not find a statistically significant 
result (though the PRE-ELECTION coefficient is again negative).  This weak result may reflect: 
(1) the fact that voters may attribute less responsibility to the President for failures of smaller 
banks (which make up the bulk of our failures) since their performance more correlated with 
local conditions implying the cost of failure remains locally concentrated despite being federally 
regulated; and/or (2) reflect a lack of power in our tests since there is no variation across banks in 
the timing of Presidential elections. 
4.2.2. Defining failure as outright failure only  
Up to this point, we have defined bank failure to mean either (1) outright failure where 
the failing bank loses its charter and ceases to operate or (2) assistance transactions, where the 
failing bank is given FDIC assistance, restructured and allowed to continue operating under its 
original charter.  While assistance transactions only make up a relatively small fraction of the 
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recorded failures (593 out of 3995 recorded failures between 1934 and 2012), to rule out the 
possibility our result is driven by our classification, we redefine failure to be only cases where a 
bank’s charter is revoked and repeat the analysis presented in Table 2 Panel A.  The results of 
this analysis are presented in Table 2 Panel B.  Our results remain virtually unchanged.  The 
PRE-ELECTION variable is of the same sign and order of magnitude and significance as our 
previous analysis.  All control variables are also very similar to those obtained previously with 
the exception of the coefficient estimate for our TOO BIG TO FAIL variable.  We previously 
found a positive coefficient on TOO BIG TO FAIL implying that banks with a larger market 
share are more likely to fail, and argued that this unintuitive result is driven by our classification 
of assistance transactions as failures (since larger and more prominent banks are more likely to 
receive assistance).  Indeed, when we redefine failure to mean outright failure only, we find that 
the coefficient on TOO BIG TO FAIL is negative and significant for our full sample of banks, 
consistent with the view that regulators are less willing to close banks that are ‘systematically 
important’.  The TOO BIG TO FAIL coefficient is insignificant for our sample containing only 
state banks, which reflects that fact that state chartered banks are smaller and have a smaller 
market share in comparison to federally chartered banks.   
4.2.3. Alternative estimation techniques 
We re-estimate our baseline regressions presented in Table 2 using alternative methods to 
ensure our results are robust to estimation technique.  We employ three alternative estimation 
techniques: (1) linear probability model; (2) dynamic logit model; and (3) the exponential 
proportional hazard model used in Brown and Dinc (2005).  The linear probability model and 
logit model are discrete models where the dependent variable equals one in the quarter a bank 
fails and zero otherwise.  The difference between the Cox and exponential proportional hazard 
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models is that the Cox model leaves the unconditional survival function unspecified whereas 
survival is assumed to follow an exponential distribution in the case of the latter.  The results are 
presented in Table 3 in two panels.  Panel A re-estimates our baseline regressions with our 
original definition of failure (i.e. failure is either outright failure or an assistance transaction) 
while Panel B re-estimates our baseline regressions where failure is defined as outright failure 
only.  In both panels, regression models 1-2 represent estimates from the linear probability 
regression, models 3-4 are obtained from the logit regression, and models 5-6 from the 
exponential hazard.  We find consistent results from all three estimation techniques irrespective 
of how we define failure.  First, the estimates from the exponential hazard model are very similar 
to those obtained from our Cox regression save that the coefficients are slightly larger in 
magnitude and statistically more significant.  Second, the results from the logit model are again 
similar to those obtained from the Cox regressions, however, the magnitudes of the coefficient 
estimates are larger and more significant – for state banks, implying a reduction in the hazard 
rate by about 65% in the year leading up to an election.  Finally, our linear probability estimates 
also confirm the reduction in hazard rate in the year before an election.  The point estimates are 
about -0.0002.  When compared to the unconditional failure rate of 0.001, these estimates imply 
a reduction in failure rate by about 20%.  While the magnitude of the election year reduction in 
hazard rate differs across estimation techniques, these results confirm our main result.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
4.2.4. Crisis vs. non-crisis periods 
We previously argued that controlling for financial crisis appropriately is of significant 
importance for our result since failures tend to be concentrated in crisis and since differing 
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political incentives during crises imply we are much less likely to observe political factors 
determining bank failure.  Differing political incentives during crises arise from lower private 
costs to a local politician associated with a bank failure since he can at least in part attribute the 
cause of the failure to a nation-wide problem.  Moreover, since bank failure tends to be more 
severe during a crisis, the scope for politicians to delay regulatory intervention is relatively 
limited.  This discussion implies that our PRE-ELECTION indicator should be insignificant for 
crisis periods when we do not control for variables correlated with financial crises.  To 
investigate this further we split the sample into crisis periods and non-crisis periods and re-
estimate equation 1 excluding year fixed-effects and macroeconomic controls.  The results are 
presented in Table 4 across two panels.  Panel A defines bank failures as either outright failure or 
assistance transactions while Panel B defined failure and outright failure only.  Models 1-4 
represent estimates for the crisis periods while models 5 and 6 present estimates for non-crisis 
periods.  Odd numbered models are for all banks whereas even numbered models use only state 
banks.  Comparing models 1 and 2 (crisis period) with models 5 and 6 (non-crisis period) we can 
see that the coefficient on PRE-ELECTION is actually positive and in most cases insignificant 
for the crisis period, whereas it remains negative for the non-crisis period (and also significant 
for the sample of all banks).  While the results for the non-election period remain negative they 
are weaker than previously reported.  This is due to the fact that bank failures are clustered in 
crisis periods, meaning that we lose power in our tests since there is much less variation in our 
dependent variable in the non-crisis subsample – that is, identification for our results relies on 
observing bank failure, which is concentrated during crisis periods.  To show this is the case, we 
reintroduce year-fixed effects and macroeconomic controls and re-estimate equation 1 for the 
crisis-period subsample.  Models 3 and 4 show that once we control for common time and time 
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varying determinants of crises the coefficient on PRE-ELECTION becomes negative and 
significant even in crisis periods.  The magnitudes of the coefficient estimates are also much 
larger than those obtained for the full sample reported in Table 2. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
4.2.5. Pre- and Post-FDICIA 
The S&L crisis was in part attributed to regulatory forbearance – that is, regulators 
allowed banks to continue operating with low/no net worth which lead to excessive risk taking.  
In the wake of the S&L crisis, two major reforms – the Financial Recovery, Institutions Reform 
and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989 and the FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1992 – 
were introduced to reduce the degree of regulatory discretion in bank closure rules.  The FDICIA 
in particular made it more difficult for the FDIC to use its discretion in closing a bank with the 
introduction of Prompt Corrective Action which mandates progressive penalties against banks as 
their capital ratios deteriorate.  At the extreme, the FDIC is required put a bank into receivership 
if it is deemed to be critically undercapitalised (capital ratio less than 2%).  To investigate 
whether the introduction of these major reforms changed political incentives to delay bank 
failure we split that sample into pre- and post-FDICIA and re-estimate our main regression 
excluding year-fixed effects.  The results are presented in Table 5 across two panels: Panel A for 
all banks and Panel B for state banks only.  Models 1 and 2 show that, for both pre- and post-
FDICIA subsamples, the coefficient on PRE-ELECTION is negative and significant implying 
that the introduction of the FDICIA did not eliminate political incentives to delay bank failure.  
Moreover, the magnitudes of coefficient estimates are also quite similar across the two sub-
samples.  To see if political incentives to delay bank failure increased or decreased post-FDICIA 
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we create a post-FDICIA indicator equal one for all years after 1992 and interact it with our 
PRE-ELECTION dummy and introduce this interaction term into our regression model.  We 
estimate the model using least squares since interaction terms in a non-linear model such as the 
Cox model may be biased (Ai and Norton, 2003).  The results presented in model 3 of Table 5 
show an insignificant coefficient estimate on PRE x Post-FDICIA, implying that the introduction 
of the FDICIA did not change political incentives to delay failure at all.  This result highlights 
the fact that the introduction of new rules designed to govern regulators’ discretion cannot work 
effectively without the support of the politicians.  Our example of the Cleveland Thrift, Am 
Trust, documented in our introduction is a case in point.  Even though prompt corrective action 
mandated the FDIC to step in and seize the assets of Am Trust when it became critically 
undercapitalised, political interference meant that the FDIC could not carry out this mandate. 
4.2.6. Bank Size 
 Next, to investigate whether politicians treat banks of differing sizes differently, we split 
our sample into size terciles and re-estimate our main regression to see if our PRE-ELECTION 
coefficient varies across bank size.  The results from this analysis are presented in models 4-6 in 
Table 5.  Interestingly, we find that while the coefficient estimates are negative across the bank 
size terciles, the election year reduction in hazard rate is strongest and significant for large banks.  
These findings suggests that the political gain from delaying the failure of a large bank is greatest 
which makes sense since the failure of a relatively large bank will lead to larger losses to the 
voting public and therefore have a greater bearing on an election outcome. 
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4.2.7. Excluding Louisiana 
 One of the benefits of studying the impact of the electoral cycle on bank failure in a US 
setting is that election timing is exogenous.  This is true for all states except for the state 
Louisiana where elections do not occur in the first week of November, but vary from one 
election to the next.  To ensure our results are robust, we exclude Louisiana from our sample and 
re-estimate our main regressions.  The results presented in model 7 of Table 5 show that our 
finding remains unchanged when we exclude Louisiana from our sample. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
In sum, the results in this section provide evidence supporting the view that electoral 
concerns drive politicians to take costly action to delay bank failure in an election year.  In the 
remaining sections, we will investigate the role of political competition and political control in 
magnifying or attenuating this pre-election reduction in the hazard rate.   
 
5. Electoral competition, political control and bank failure 
 In this section we investigate whether electoral competition and/or political control of the 
state legislature attenuates or exacerbates the election year reduction in hazard rate.   
The costs associated with bank failure; such as losses to uninsured depositors and 
shareholders, bank job losses, small borrowers with no alternative financing options and the 
potential reductions in local economic activity are likely to be concentrated in the state where the 
bank operates.  Accordingly, political support for the incumbent party in that state may decrease 
because of these costs.  Moreover, if the incumbent and opposition parties have similar levels of 
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voter support, the impact of the voter backlash is likely to be stronger.  Political (electoral) 
competition therefore increases the benefit to politicians from delaying bank failure and therefore 
we might expect that elections which are closely contested exacerbate the pre-election reduction 
in the hazard rate, ceteris paribus.  To measure the extent of political competition, we construct a 
variable similar to Dinc and Gupta (2011).  In particular, our party neutral measure, VICTORY 
MARGIN, is defined as the difference between the winning candidate’s vote share and the 
second place candidate’s vote share – smaller values are associated with stronger political 
competition.24  The summary statistics in Panel B of Table 1 show that gubernatorial elections 
post-1976 are on average not very competitive, with the average victory margin of 17%.  There 
is, however, significant variation in this measure with a standard deviation 14%.25  Southern 
states are marginally less competitive with an average victory margin of 18%. 
                                                            
24 In an earlier version of this paper, we used the party neutral measure of political competition developed in Besley 
et al. (2010).  Their measure uses data originating from the work of Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002), who collected 
election results for a broad set of directly elected state executive offices.  These elections range from US 
representatives, over the governorship, to down-ballot officers, such as Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, 
Attorney General, and so on.  We thank James Snyder for generously providing us with an updated version of this 
data which was used in our earlier work. 
25 These summary statistics based on a post-1976 sample hide some of the substantial variation in political 
competition over time in the US – in particular in the US Southern states in the first half of the 20th century.  By the 
1880s, the Democrats held a virtual monopoly over political office in the US Southern states.  They achieved this by 
limiting the political participation of the black and low income population which made up the supporter base of their 
main rivals – the Republicans.  Several voting restrictions were introduced over the years including: the white 
primary, multiple ballot boxes, poll taxes, literacy tests, and ultimately violence.  This effectively eliminated 
opposition to the Democrats (most gubernatorial elections in the South during this period were uncontested).  Over 
time, a number of these practices were eliminated, and by the late 1950s, the remaining two major obstacles to full 
political participation were the poll tax and the literacy test.  It was not until the 1960s that the dominance of the 
Democrats in US South was challenged with the 24th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1964, 
prohibiting poll taxes in federal elections, and the introduction of the 1965 Voting Rights Act which did two things: 
(1) it authorized the US attorney general to challenge the constitutionality of the use of poll taxes in state and local 
actions; and (2) it provided for direct federal action in “covered jurisdictions” to prohibit the use of the literacy test.  
A covered jurisdiction was defined to be a state, county, parish, or town that used a test or device (e.g., a literacy 
test) and had less than a 50% turnout in the 1964 presidential election.  Consequently, federal courts quickly struck 
down the remaining poll taxes in Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia.  The 1965 Voting Rights Act also 
targeted the states of Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, 40 counties in North Carolina, 
Apache County in Arizona, and Honolulu County in Hawaii because of their literacy tests and low turnout.  The 
resultant impact on political competition in the US South was a reversal of the pre-war decline. 
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In our empirical application, we construct a dummy variable: HIGH VICTORY 
MARGIN (i.e. low competition) equal to one for elections with above median victory margins.26  
We are interested in the coefficient estimate on the interaction term between this dummy variable 
and our PRE-ELECTION variable.  Note that we do not include the level effect of HIGH 
VICTORY MARGIN since we only observe electoral outcomes at in election years.  This 
approach has been used by other researchers studying electoral competition (e.g. Julio and Yook, 
2012).  From our previous discussion, we expect that if higher competition exacerbates the 
political incentive to delay bank failure then the coefficient on the interaction between PRE-
ELECTION and HIGH VICTORY MARGIN will be positive.  Again, since interaction terms in 
non-linear models may be biased (Ai and Norton, 2003) we estimate our models for this analysis 
using least squares.  The results are presented in models 1-4 of Table 6.  Regression models 3 
and 4 also include an additional control variable DEMOCRAT GOVERNOR, which is equal one 
when the governor is a democrat, as well as the interaction between DEMOCRAT GOVERNOR 
and PRE-ELECTION.   
This analysis shows that with or without the inclusion of our DEMOCRAT GOVERNOR 
control the coefficient estimate on PRE x HIGH VICTORY MARGIN is positive as expected, 
however, the relation is statistically insignificant.   
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Our insignificant electoral competition results are, on face value, surprising.  However, 
while we argued earlier that the benefit of delay to the politician is increasing with political 
competition, there are at least two reasons as to why we might observe a larger reduction in the 
                                                            
26 The average victory margin for elections with above (below) median victory margins is 24.91% (2.05%) with a 
minimum value of 11.36% (21.1%) and a maximum of 5.2% (0%). 
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pre-election hazard rate for less competitive elections – meaning the net effect is an empirical 
matter.   
First, it is likely that the costs of delay are also increasing with political competition.  
Private costs associated with delay are those incurred in the event such corrupt behaviour is 
detected.  There have been numerous studies looking at the cost of corruption charges on 
politicians’ subsequent electoral performance (e.g. Alford et. al., 1994; Jacobsen and Dimock, 
1994; and Peters and Welch, 1980) and politicians’ decisions to retire (e.g. Groseclose and 
Krehbiel, 1994; and Hall and Van Houweling, 1995).27  These costs can be increasing with 
competition for several reasons.  First, political competition increases the likelihood that any 
corrupt behaviour by incumbent politicians is detected since opposition parties are either more 
numbered and/or more incentivized to monitor the actions of the incumbent leading into an 
election.  Rising private costs to the politician reduces their incentive to delay bank failure.  
More broadly, this idea is related to the large debate on whether political competition reduces 
corruption.  In general, this literature suggests that competitive elections serve as a disciplining 
role against corruption.28   
The second condition influencing the cost of delaying bank failure are the transactions 
costs associated with decision making.  As political competition increases, more actors are 
involved in the decision-making process and as more decision points must be crossed, 
transactions costs increase.  These kinds of transactions costs are often referred to as veto points 
                                                            
27 Indeed, three of the five “Keating Five” senators retired following an investigation into their interference in the 
FDIC investigation of Charles Keating, the chairman of Lincoln S&L.  These were Alan Cranston (Democrat of 
California), Dennis DeConcini (Democrat of Arizona), and Donald W. Riegle, Jr. (Democrat of Michigan). 
28 See studies by Barro (1973), Rose-Ackerman (1978), Ferejohn (1986), Shleifer and Vishny (1993); Aidt (2003), 
Alt and Lassen (2003) for theoretical contributions.  Empirical contributions also support the idea that political 
competition reduces corruption; see for example, Kunivcova and Rose-Ackerman (2005), Lederman et. al. (2005); 
Tavits (2007); and Nyblade and Reed (2008). 
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(Tsebelis 1995 and 2002).  More veto points make policy commitments more credible (i.e. 
irreversible), but they also make them more costly and time-consuming to implement and 
change.  To the extent that bank closure policy is more credible in states-years with more veto 
players, we expect political competition to reduce the ability of incumbent politician’s ability to 
make discretionary policy decisions like delaying bank failure.  Evidence of the important role of 
veto players in economic policy making can be found in Keefer and Stasavage (2003), who study 
the role of veto players on the degree of central bank independence and subsequent credibility 
(i.e. effectiveness) of monetary policy.  The authors show that rising veto players enhances 
central bank independence by reducing the time inconsistency of monetary policy and also 
reduces central bank governor turnover.29 30 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
To investigate the role of political control, we construct a variable CONTROL OF BOTH 
HOUSES which is an indicator that equals one if the governor’s party has control (i.e. holds the 
                                                            
29 Their measure of veto players is based on whether the executive and legislative chamber(s) are controlled by 
different parties in presidential systems and on the number of parties in the government coalition for parliamentary 
systems.  The indicator rises with the number of veto players (depending upon the number of legislative chambers) 
and falls when the veto points are occupied by the same political party (depending on whether majorities are 
multiparty coalitions).  The index is then modified to take account of the fact that certain electoral rules (closed list 
vs. open list) affect the cohesiveness of governing coalitions.   
30 Another possible explanation for a negative relation between political competition and incentives delay may exist 
due to political patronage – the idea that rent seeking politicians tend to make decisions to reward supporters (see 
Cox and McCubbins, 1986; and Persson and Tabellini, 2002).  Note that Ansolabehere and Snyder (2007) argue that 
it is possible that politicians may target both areas that support them as well as politically competitive areas.  
Previous evidence of political patronage include Ansolabehere and Snyder (2007) who show governing parties 
provide more public funds to regions that support them, and Dinc and Gupta (2011) who show that politicians do not 
privatize firms located in the state from which a minister with jurisdiction over that firm is elected.  In an earlier 
version of the paper, we also calculate a measure of electoral competition to capture the partisan support for the 
incumbent to investigate the role of political patronage.  In particular, we calculate the Democrat vote share across 
all gubernatorial candidates in any given election and interact it with the party affiliation of the incumbent governor 
in an election year.  We find some weak evidence that patronage may play a role – Democrat (Republican) states 
with Democrat (Republican) governors tend to have an even larger reduction in the election year hazard rate.  
However, since the exact role of political patronage is difficult to disentangle from political control (i.e. states which 
are heavily Democrat (Republican) with a Democrat (Republican) governor tend also to be the ones in which the 
governor’s party has more control), and since the analysis relies on using triple interactions which may be biased, 
we do not report the results in this version of the paper.  We can provide these results upon request. 
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majority of seats) of both the lower and upper house simultaneously (i.e. complete control of the 
state legislature) and interact it with our PRE-ELECTION variable.31  The results are presented 
in models 5-10 of Table 6.  Models 5 and 6 do not control for any additional political factors, 
models 7 and 8 include our proxy for electoral competition and model 9 and 10 include 
additional variables to capture the party affiliation of the governor.  Across all specifications, the 
coefficient estimate for PRE × CONTROL OF BOTH HOUSES is negative and significant.  
Additionally, the coefficient estimates on our PRE-ELECTION variable not only becomes 
insignificant but reverses in sign.  These results imply that all of the election year fall in hazard 
rate can be explained by states where the incumbent governor has complete control of the state 
legislature.  Moreover, the coefficient on the level effect of CONTROL OF BOTH HOUSES is 
positive indicating that political control seems to allow politicians to substitute lower bank 
failure in the 12 months prior to an election for higher bank failure in other periods.  The 
economic significance of political control is large.  For our most complete regression model 
(model 10) the coefficient on PRE × CONTROL OF BOTH HOUSES is -0.00043, when 
compared to the unconditional failure rate of 0.001, this number implies that in election years 
where a governor has control of both the upper and lower house, there is a reduction in the bank 
hazard rate by about 43%, which is more than double the reduction the election year hazard rate 
previously estimated using a linear probability model reported in Table 3.  All other political 
variables remain insignificant regardless of specification. 
                                                            
31 We also examine situations where the governor controls: (1) the lower house but not the upper house, and (2) the 
upper house but not the lower house.  In these analyses, which are not reported, we do not find any evidence to 
suggest that ‘partial’ control of the state legislature has an impact on the election year fall in bank hazard rate.  In 
alternative specifications, we show that an increasing margin of the governor’s party in the lower/upper house 
increases the magnitude of the election year fall in hazard rate, however the results are not significant in most cases 
so are not reported. 
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These results are consistent with the view that political control tends to lead to more 
corrupt behaviour.  The mechanism through which this occurs is less clear however.  As 
discussed earlier, the disciplining role of political competition can come from: (1) rising private 
costs to the politician in the event corrupt behaviour is detected; (2) rising costs associated with 
discretionary policy changes with more veto players when there is a balance of power; or (3) 
some combination of the two.  These results are also consistent with recent studies showing that 
political competition improves economic outcomes and is therefore welfare enhancing (see for 
example, Polo, 1998; Svensson, 1998; and Besley et al., 2010).  To the extent that political 
competition enhances competition in the banking industry whereby bank failure is an efficient 
mechanism to ensure poor performing banks exit – thereby increasing the overall health of the 
local bank industry – one might expect that political control is negatively correlated with bank 
failure.  Our finding is also in line with arguments made by Haber (2004, 2008) who 
demonstrates that political competition lead to the breakdown of segmented banking monopolies 
and increased bank competition in the US over the last century.   
 
6. Conclusion 
We exploit exogenous variation in the timing of gubernatorial elections to study political 
incentives to delay bank failure around elections.  In particular, we examine whether bank failure 
is less likely in the 12 months leading up to an election.  Using a hazard analysis, our results 
show that bank failure is about 45% less likely in the year leading up to an election.   
We also investigate if political control exacerbates or attenuates the election year fall in 
the hazard rate and find strong support that political control can explain the election year fall in 
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the hazard rate.  That is, we show that election years in which the governor’s party has control of 
both the upper and lower house of the state legislature (i.e. complete political control) can 
explain all of the average election year fall in hazard rate.  In particular, our estimates suggest 
that the election year reduction in hazard rate more than doubles for banks in states where the 
governor has complete control heading into an election. 
Our results demonstrate that even developed democracies such as the US are not immune 
from the incentive problems faced by politicians.  The implications for public policy are twofold.  
First, bank regulatory and closure rules need to account for the perverse incentives of politicians.  
Similar to central bank independence, the results here suggest that bank regulators may also 
require the same type of independence to effectively carry out their role.  Second, political 
competition appears to discipline politicians by increasing the costs associated with interfering in 
bank closure policy.  This finding illustrates the importance of political institutions which foster 
political competition and reduce the degree of political control any single individual (or group) 
has in an economy. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
This table presents summary statistics of bank failures and the key variables used in this study.  Panel A presents a summary of the frequency of bank and thrift failures for all bank failures between 
1934 and 2012 as well as broken down into subcategories.  Crisis denotes failures occurring between 1986 and 1992 (S&L Crisis) and between 2007 and 2010 (Global Financial Crisis).  Note that an 
FDIC recorded failure can either be an outright failure where the institution loses its charter and ceases to operate or and assistance transaction whereby the institution is restructured and allowed to 
retain its charter.  Panel B presents the state level controls used in the hazard analysis (sample period 1976-2010).  Panel C presents the bank level controls used in the hazard analysis (sample period 
1976-2010). 
Panel A: Failures                 
  Months around election All Crisis Non-crisis South West North East Mid-West 
1934-2012 
All Banks and Thrifts [-12,0] 941 705 236 433 161 97 250 
[0,+12] 963 577 386 446 151 133 233 
Not around election 2091 1540 551 1100 317 195 479 
Commercial Banks Only [-12,0] 561 410 151 281 88 42 150 
[0,+12] 656 333 323 327 96 61 172 
Not around election 1311 855 456 676 204 111 320 
National Banks [-12,0] 201 165 36 127 33 18 23 
[0,+12] 181 125 56 99 27 24 31 
Not around election 433 329 104 297 56 36 44 
State Banks [-12,0] 360 245 115 154 55 24 127 
[0,+12] 475 208 267 228 69 37 141 
Not around election 878 526 352 379 148 75 276 
Assistance [-12,0] 141 59 82 56 18 21 46 
[0,+12] 94 47 47 43 14 18 19 
Not around election 358 283 75 205 41 21 91 
Outright Failure [-12,0] 800 646 154 377 143 76 204 
[0,+12] 869 530 339 403 137 115 214 
Not around election 1733 1257 476 895 276 174 388 
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1976-2012 
All Banks and Thrifts [-12,0] 850 705 145 420 158 68 204 
[0,+12] 783 577 206 384 143 110 146 
Not around election 1840 1540 300 1021 304 137 378 
Commercial Banks Only [-12,0] 470 410 60 268 85 13 104 
[0,+12] 476 333 143 265 88 38 85 
Not around election 1062 855 207 597 191 54 220 
National Banks [-12,0] 182 165 17 126 30 4 22 
[0,+12] 151 125 26 96 23 14 18 
Not around election 386 329 57 283 48 16 39 
State Banks [-12,0] 288 245 43 142 55 9 82 
[0,+12] 325 208 117 169 65 24 67 
Not around election 676 526 150 314 143 38 181 
Assistance [-12,0] 141 59 82 56 18 21 46 
[0,+12] 93 47 46 43 14 17 19 
Not around election 357 283 74 205 41 21 90 
Outright Failure [-12,0] 709 646 63 364 140 47 158 
[0,+12] 690 530 160 341 129 93 127 
  Not around election 1483 1257 226 816 263 116 288 
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 Panel B: State Level Variables  Definitions   All Crisis Non-crisis South West North East Mid-West 
          
Victory Margin (party neutral) winner vote percentage - second vote percentage Mean 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.16 
SD 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.13 
Democrat Vote Share democrat votes/total votes Mean 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.52 0.48 0.47 0.46 
SD 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.12 
Governor is Democrat indicator equal 1 if the governor is a democrat Mean 0.53 0.56 0.52 0.61 0.58 0.52 0.38 
SD 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.49 0.49 0.5 0.49 
% Democrat in lower house democrat seats/total seats in the lower house of state legislature Mean 0.57 0.58 0.56 0.67 0.49 0.6 0.48 
SD 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.11 
% Democrat in upper house democrat seats/total seats in upper house of state legislature Mean 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.68 0.49 0.57 0.47 
SD 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.12 
Growth state income growth Mean 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 
SD 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Budget Deficit (total taxes-government expenditure)/gross state product Mean -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 
    SD 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 
Employment total employed persons / population Mean 0.57 0.58 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.58 
  SD 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.17 0.06 0.05 0.07 
 
Panel C: Bank Level Variables                 
      All Crisis Non-crisis Failed banks Assisted Banks Other banks 
Too Big to Fail bank assets/total state banking assets Mean 0.0048 0.0049 0.0047 0.0026 0.0206 0.0048 
SD 0.0286 0.0295 0.0281 0.0097 0.0675 0.0286 
Too Many to Fail ave. capital ratio of other banks in the same state Mean 0.0994 0.099 0.0996 0.0904 0.0875 0.0994 
SD 0.0175 0.0211 0.0157 0.02 0.0418 0.0175 
Income/Asset Ratio net income/total assets Mean 0.0153 0.0038 0.0217 -0.0449 -0.0231 0.0154 
SD 9.4348 0.0823 11.7264 0.0577 0.0578 9.441 
Size log(total deposits) Mean 10.7383 10.9572 10.6414 10.7036 11.5951 10.7384 
SD 1.411 1.381 1.4132 1.507 2.2158 1.4108 
Capital Ratio total equity/total assets Mean 0.0995 0.0991 0.0997 0.0007 0.0013 0.0996 
SD 0.0665 0.0744 0.0627 0.0616 0.1056 0.0664 
NPL non-performing loans/total loans (%) Mean 1.8864 2.4513 1.4763 13.6842 9.6820 1.869 
SD 2.8619 3.3759 2.3372 9.2565 8.8496 2.8054 
Charter authority indicator equal 1 if federal charter Mean 0.3019 0.3051 0.3006 0.3539 0.4430 0.3019 
    SD 0.4591 0.4604 0.4585 0.4783 0.4984 0.4591 
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Table 2 
Election cycles and bank failure 
This table presents the regression estimates of equation (1) using the Cox proportional hazard model. The independent variable of interest is: PRE-ELECTION which is an indicator variable equal to 
one for all quarters in the 12 months prior to an election date. Control variables include: (1) INCOME/ASSET which is the ratio of net income to total assets; (2) SIZE which is the natural log of total 
deposits; (3) CAPITAL RATIO which is the ratio of total equity to total assets; (4) NPL which is non-performing loans (+90 days past due) as a percentage of total loans; (5) GROWTH is personal 
income growth in state j; (6) EMPLOYMENT which is the ratio of total employed persons to the population in state j; (7) BUDGET DEFICIT is the ratio of total taxes less government expenditure to 
gross domestic product in state j (8) TOO BIG TO FAIL which is the ratio of bank i’s assets to total banking assets in the state bank i is headquartered; and (9) TOO MANY TO FAIL which is the 
average capital ratio of all other banks in the state bank i is headquartered in. Panel A presents results where we classify ‘failure’ to mean either outright failure or/and FDIC assistance transaction.  
Panel B presents results where we classify ‘failure’ as outright failures only. The reported coefficients are marginal effects. Robust Z-statistics (clustered standard errors by state) are in parentheses. 
Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are represented by *, **, and ***. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: All failures                   
PRE-ELECTION -0.113 -0.468** -0.448** -0.151 -0.559* -0.561* -0.0751 -0.548 -0.480 
(-1.121) (-2.376) (-2.281) (-1.092) (-1.916) (-1.916) (-0.542) (-1.519) (-1.366) 
INCOME/ASSET -3.080*** -1.594 -1.752 -6.861*** -4.041 -4.056 -2.356* -1.433 -1.791 
(-3.870) (-0.486) (-0.514) (-5.085) (-0.827) (-0.818) (-1.819) (-0.186) (-0.222) 
SIZE -0.249*** -0.114 -0.158*** -0.331*** -0.126 -0.168** -0.178** -0.139 -0.212** 
(-4.222) (-1.634) (-2.662) (-5.411) (-1.459) (-2.255) (-2.242) (-1.359) (-2.239) 
CAPITAL RATIO -11.30*** -44.93*** -44.88*** -13.46*** -45.25*** -45.29*** -9.699*** -47.76*** -48.13*** 
(-5.857) (-13.37) (-13.34) (-4.740) (-8.297) (-8.433) (-6.439) (-7.488) (-7.795) 
NPL 0.0943*** 0.0545*** 0.0561*** 0.0922*** 0.0453*** 0.0458*** 0.0970*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 
(14.30) (7.189) (7.355) (8.614) (3.041) (3.152) (11.23) (5.732) (5.810) 
GROWTH -5.906 -6.562 -19.04** -19.06** 13.13 13.73 
(-0.922) (-0.999) (-2.499) (-2.525) (1.442) (1.599) 
EMPLOYMENT -25.48*** -24.15*** -23.46*** -23.81** -32.53*** -28.87*** 
(-3.445) (-3.187) (-2.598) (-2.560) (-3.081) (-2.665) 
BUDGET DEFICIT 14.56 10.89 12.99 13.42 46.98* 51.36** 
(0.981) (0.731) (0.668) (0.728) (1.884) (2.321) 
TOO BIG TO FAIL 3.699*** 5.634*** 2.858* 
(3.529) (3.991) (1.840) 
TOO MANY TO FAIL 5.488 -1.833 12.97* 
(0.937) (-0.259) (1.720) 
Sample All banks All banks All banks State banks State banks State banks Federal banks Federal banks Federal banks 
State fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,165,698 654,553 654,553 819,884 474,540 474,540 345,814 180,013 180,013 
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Wald p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel B: Outright failures                   
PRE-ELECTION -0.0796 -0.411** -0.407** -0.121 -0.532* -0.536* -0.0607 -0.416 -0.398 
(-0.721) (-2.075) (-2.060) (-0.797) (-1.750) (-1.753) (-0.408) (-1.240) (-1.166) 
INCOME/ASSET -3.187*** -3.747 -3.838 -7.573*** -5.069 -5.043 0.328 -7.694 -8.224* 
(-5.643) (-1.068) (-1.047) (-4.874) (-0.958) (-0.944) (0.588) (-1.616) (-1.710) 
SIZE -0.282*** -0.0494 -0.0102 -0.349*** -0.100 -0.106 -0.251** 0.0260 0.181 
(-5.110) (-0.577) (-0.101) (-5.450) (-1.183) (-1.247) (-2.377) (0.205) (0.981) 
CAPITAL RATIO -11.60*** -44.35*** -44.30*** -13.27*** -44.19*** -44.20*** -11.53*** -51.05*** -51.48*** 
(-5.676) (-13.22) (-13.13) (-4.610) (-7.599) (-7.617) (-5.744) (-12.29) (-12.54) 
NPL 0.0955*** 0.0551*** 0.0550*** 0.0935*** 0.0466*** 0.0465*** 0.101*** 0.0970*** 0.0973*** 
(15.23) (6.711) (6.833) (9.502) (3.135) (3.199) (11.10) (4.321) (4.580) 
GROWTH -7.675 -7.426 -17.55** -17.40** 13.14* 13.97 
(-1.217) (-1.185) (-2.281) (-2.293) (1.663) (1.638) 
EMPLOYMENT -24.42*** -24.27*** -24.14*** -24.32*** -21.39 -19.23 
(-3.263) (-3.073) (-2.598) (-2.579) (-1.589) (-1.297) 
BUDGET DEFICIT 10.16 9.870 10.93 11.71 68.37*** 63.12** 
(0.618) (0.622) (0.583) (0.660) (2.765) (2.473) 
TOO BIG TO FAIL -6.386* 1.106 -21.33 
(-1.904) (0.498) (-1.435) 
TOO MANY TO FAIL 2.186 -1.953 6.661 
(0.323) (-0.231) (1.179) 
Sample All banks All banks All banks State banks State banks State banks Federal banks Federal banks Federal banks 
State fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,168,037 655,883 655,883 821,176 475,340 475,340 346,861 180,543 180,543 
Wald p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 3 
Election cycles and bank failure – alternative estimation techniques 
This table presents the regression estimates of equation (1) using three alternative estimation techniques: (1) linear probability (models 1-2); (2) dynamic logit (models 3-4); and (3) exponential 
proportional hazard (models 5-6). The independent variable of interest is PRE-ELECTION which is an indicator variable equal to one for all quarters in the 12 months prior to an election date. 
Control variables include: (1) INCOME/ASSET which is the ratio of net income to total assets; (2) SIZE which is the natural log of total deposits; (3) CAPITAL RATIO which is the ratio of total 
equity to total assets; (4) NPL which is non-performing loans (+90 days past due) as a percentage of total loans; (5) GROWTH is personal income growth in state j; (6) EMPLOYMENT which is the 
ratio of total employed persons to the population in state j; (7) BUDGET DEFICIT is the ratio of total taxes less government expenditure to gross domestic product in state j (8) TOO BIG TO FAIL 
which is the ratio of bank i’s assets to total banking assets in the state bank i is headquartered; and (9) TOO MANY TO FAIL which is the average capital ratio of all other banks in the state bank i is 
headquartered in. Panel A presents results where we classify ‘failure’ to mean either outright failure or and FDIC assistance transaction.  Panel B presents results where we classify ‘failure’ as outright 
failures only. The reported coefficients are marginal effects. Robust Z/t-statistics (clustered standard errors by state) are in parentheses. Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are represented by *, 
**, and ***. 
 
  Linear Probability Logit Exponential 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: All failures             
PRE-ELECTION -0.000218** -0.000201* -0.754*** -0.916*** -0.501*** -0.581*** 
(-2.373) (-1.842) (-4.266) (-4.485) (-3.057) (-2.999) 
Sample All banks State banks All banks State banks All banks State banks 
Control variables 1-9 YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 658,485 477,425 569,712 388,898 654,553 474,540 
F/Wald p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Panel B: Outright failures             
PRE-ELECTION -0.000204** -0.000189* -0.863*** -1.050*** -0.584*** -0.683*** 
(-2.132) (-1.930) (-4.269) (-5.129) (-3.272) (-3.326) 
Sample All banks State banks All banks State banks All banks State banks 
Control variables 1-9 YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 658,485 477,425 569,712 388,898 654,553 474,540 
F/Wald p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 4 
Election cycles and bank failure – crisis vs. non-crisis periods 
This table presents the regression estimates of equation (1) using the Cox proportional hazard model for crisis periods (models 1-4) and non-crisis periods (models 5-6) separately. Crisis periods are 
all years between 1986 and 1992 (S&L Crisis) and 2007 and 2010 (Global Financial Crisis). The independent variable of interest is: PRE-ELECTION which is an indicator variable equal to one for all 
quarters in the 12 months prior to an election date. Control variables include: (1) INCOME/ASSET which is the ratio of net income to total assets; (2) SIZE which is the natural log of total deposits; 
(3) CAPITAL RATIO which is the ratio of total equity to total assets; (4) NPL which is non-performing loans (+90 days past due) as a percentage of total loans; (5) GROWTH is personal income 
growth in state j; (6) EMPLOYMENT which is the ratio of total employed persons to the population in state j; (7) BUDGET DEFICIT is the ratio of total taxes less government expenditure to gross 
domestic product in state j (8) TOO BIG TO FAIL which is the ratio of bank i’s assets to total banking assets in the state bank i is headquartered; and (9) TOO MANY TO FAIL which is the average 
capital ratio of all other banks in the state bank i is headquartered in. Panel A presents results where we classify ‘failure’ to mean either outright failure or and FDIC assistance transaction.  Panel B 
presents results where we classify ‘failure’ as outright failures only.   The reported coefficients are marginal effects. Robust Z-statistics (clustered standard errors by state) are in parentheses. 
Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are represented by *, **, and ***. 
 
  Crisis Periods Non-Crisis Periods 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: All failures             
PRE-ELECTION 0.167 0.0736 -0.864*** -1.150** -0.466* -0.192 
(1.241) (0.386) (-3.057) (-2.490) (-1.669) (-0.577) 
Sample All banks State banks All banks State banks All banks State banks 
State fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed-effects NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Controls 1-4 YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls 5-9 NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Observations 440,588 307,328 137,792 101,157 725,110 512,556 
Wald p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Panel B: Outright failures             
PRE-ELECTION 0.258* 0.121 -0.733** -1.085** -0.459* -0.189 
(1.724) (0.579) (-2.518) (-2.237) (-1.652) (-0.569) 
Sample All banks State banks All banks State banks All banks State banks 
State fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed-effects NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Controls 1-4 YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls 5-9 NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Observations 441,679 307,878 138,121 101,326 726,358 513,298 
Wald p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 5 
Election cycles and bank failure – robustness  
This table presents the regression estimates of equation (1) using the Cox proportional hazard model for various sub-samples. The independent variable of interest is PRE-ELECTION which is an 
indicator variable equal to one for all quarters in the 12 months prior to an election date. Control variables include: (1) INCOME/ASSET which is the ratio of net income to total assets; (2) SIZE 
which is the natural log of total deposits; (3) CAPITAL RATIO which is the ratio of total equity to total assets; (4) NPL which is non-performing loans (+90 days past due) as a percentage of total 
loans; (5) GROWTH is personal income growth in state j; (6) EMPLOYMENT which is the ratio of total employed persons to the population in state j; (7) BUDGET DEFICIT is the ratio of total 
taxes less government expenditure to gross domestic product in state j (8) TOO BIG TO FAIL which is the ratio of bank i’s assets to total banking assets in the state bank i is headquartered; (9) TOO 
MANY TO FAIL which is the average capital ratio of all other banks in the state bank i is headquartered in; and (10) POST-FDICIA which is an indicator equal one for all years after the introduction 
of the FDIC Improvement Act in 1992. We classify ‘failure’ to mean either outright failure or and FDIC assistance transaction. The reported coefficients are marginal effects. Panel A presents results 
for the full sample of banks. Panel B presents results for state banks only. Robust Z-statistics (clustered standard errors by state) are in parentheses. Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are 
represented by *, **, and ***. 
Pre-FDICIA Post-FDICIA Linear Probability Small banks Medium banks Large banks Ex-Louisiana 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: All banks 
PRE-ELECTION -0.685** -0.635** -0.000565** -1.451 0.0120 -0.569*** -0.480** 
(-2.517) (-2.431) (-2.042) (-1.322) (0.0225) (-2.615) (-2.404) 
PRE × Post-FDICIA -0.00005 
(-0.217) 
POST-FDICIA 0.000503* 
(1.825) 
State fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Control variables 1-9 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed-effects NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Observations 181,322 473,231 658,485 106,241 226,490 321,822 642,887 
Wald p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Panel B: State banks 
PRE-ELECTION -0.671** -0.827*** -0.000516* -0.648 -0.259 -0.916*** -0.589* 
(-2.090) (-2.795) (-1.890) (-1.165) (-0.374) (-2.641) (-1.936) 
PRE × Post-FDICA -0.00007 
(-0.321) 
Post-FDICA 0.000450 
(1.674) 
State fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Control variables 1-9 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed-effects NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Observations 126,685 347,855 477,425 86,318 168,260 219,962 464,606 
Wald p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 6 
Electoral competition, political control and electoral incentives to delay failure  
This table presents the regression estimates of equation (1) using the linear probability model. The independent variable of interest is PRE-ELECTION which is an indicator variable equal to one for 
all quarters in the 12 months prior to an election date.  This table includes additional variables to examine the impact of electoral competition and political control.  The measure of electoral 
competition used in this table is a party neutral measure defined as the difference between the winner’s percentage vote share and the runner up’s percentage vote share.  We construct an indicator 
variable HIGH VICTORY MARGIN for above median values of victory margin (i.e. least competitive elections) interacted with the PRE-ELECTION indicator.  We construct a variable CONTROL 
OF BOTH HOUSES which is an indicator equal one if the governor’s party has control (i.e. holds the majority of seats) of both the lower and upper house simultaneously.  Of interest is the 
interaction between this variable with the PRE-ELECTION indicator.  Control variables include: (1) INCOME/ASSET which is the ratio of net income to total assets; (2) SIZE which is the natural log 
of total deposits; (3) CAPITAL RATIO which is the ratio of total equity to total assets; (4) NPL which is non-performing loans (+90 days past due) as a percentage of total loans; (5) GROWTH is 
personal income growth in state j; (6) EMPLOYMENT which is the ratio of total employed persons to the population in state j; (7) BUDGET DEFICIT is the ratio of total taxes less government 
expenditure to gross domestic product in state j (8) TOO BIG TO FAIL which is the ratio of bank i’s assets to total banking assets in the state bank i is headquartered; (9) TOO MANY TO FAIL 
which is the average capital ratio of all other banks in the state bank i is headquartered in; and (10) DEMOCRAT GOVERNOR which is an indicator equal 1 if the governor is from the democrat 
party.  We classify ‘failure’ to mean either outright failure or and FDIC assistance transaction. The reported coefficients are marginal effects. Robust Z-statistics (clustered standard errors by state) are 
in parentheses. Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are represented by *, **, and ***. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
    
PRE-ELECTION -0.000294*** -0.000267*** -0.000186* -0.000247 0.0000584 0.000104 -0.0000461 0.0000010 0.0000601 0.0000410 
(-3.166) (-2.703) (-1.929) (-1.645) (0.522) (0.839) (-0.389) (0.00751) (0.461) (0.265) 
PRE × HIGH VICTORY MARGIN 0.000173 0.000153 0.000102 0.000136 0.000197* 0.000203 0.000114 0.000147 
(1.570) (1.057) (0.985) (1.054) (1.833) (1.488) (1.069) (1.129) 
PRE × CONTROL OF BOTH HOUSES -0.000389* -0.000425** -0.000388* -0.000429** -0.000373* -0.000427** 
(-1.876) (-2.138) (-1.917) (-2.205) (-1.839) (-2.133) 
CONTROL OF BOTH HOUSES 0.000397*** 0.000417*** 0.000400*** 0.000421*** 0.000404*** 0.000427*** 
(2.826) (2.807) (2.836) (2.816) (3.003) (2.974) 
DEMOCRAT GOVERNOR -0.000099 -0.000108 -0.000130 -0.000142 
(-0.485) (-0.552) (-0.661) (-0.751) 
PRE x DEMOCRAT GOVERNOR -0.000168 -0.000031 -0.000136 -0.0000003 
(-0.952) (-0.158) (-0.818) (-0.00165) 
Sample All banks State banks All banks State banks All banks State banks All banks State banks All banks State banks 
Control variables 1-9 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 658,485 477,425 646,971 468,661 658,485 477,425 646,971 468,661 646,971 468,661 
F statistic p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
